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Abstract. We present several weaknesses in the key scheduling algo-
rithm of RC4 when the secret key contains an initialization vector – a
cryptographic scheme typically used by the WEP and WPA protocols to
protect IEEE 802.11 wireless communications. First, we show how the
previously discovered key recovery attacks can be improved by reducing
the dependency between the secret key bytes. Then, we describe two
new weaknesses related to the modulo operation of the key scheduling
algorithm. Finally, we describe a passive-only attack able to significantly
improve the key recovery process on WEP with a data complexity of 215
eavesdropped packets.
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1 Introduction
RC4 is a stream cipher designed by Ronald Rivest in 1987. It had been initially
a trade secret until the algorithm was anonymously posted to the Cypherpunks
mailing list in September 1994. Nowadays, RC4 is still widely used: it is the
default cipher of the SSL/TLS protocol and a cryptographic primitive of the
WPA protocol. Its popularity probably comes from its simplicity and the cheap
computational cost of the encryption and decryption. Due to its straightfor-
wardness, RC4 has initiated extensive research, revealing weaknesses in case of
misuse. The most famous example is the attack on the WEP (Wired Equivalent
Privacy) protocol.
WEP is a part of the IEEE 802.11 wireless standard ratified in 1999 [1].
It was designed to provide confidentiality on wireless communications by using
RC4. In order to simplify the key set up, WEP uses preinstalled fixed keys.
However, RC4 is a stream cipher: the same secret key must never be used twice.
To prevent any repetition, WEP concatenates to the key an initialization vector
(IV), where the IV is a 24-bit value which is publicly disclosed in the header of
the protocol.
The first analysis of the WEP standard has been done in 2001 by Borisov,
Goldberg and Wagner in [2]. They demonstrated major security flaws revealing
that WEP does not provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication. The
same year, Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir in [3] showed a noteworthy ciphertext-
only attack on WEP based on the concatenated IV scheme on RC4. They proved
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that the secret part of the key can be recovered if a large amount of encrypted
packets with some specific IV values are passively eavesdropped. In fact, these
so called weak keys or weak IV classes were previously discovered by Andrew
Roos [4] and David Wagner [5] four years before the publication of the IEEE
802.11b standard.
A practical issue of the key recovery process is to passively obtain a large
amount of encrypted packets (about 4 millions of encrypted packets to recover
the secret key with a success probability of 50%). To reduce this constraint,
David Hulton [6] in 2002, Andrea Bittau [7] in 2003 and a hacker nicknamed
Korek [8, 9] in 2004 highlighted more weak IV classes. Thus, the amount of
encrypted packets needed to recover the secret key with the same probability of
success has been divided by four.
On the active side, WEP is not protected against active replay attacks: it
is possible to replay some specific eavesdropped packets to generate wireless
network traffic. Thus, the amount of encrypted packets with different IVs may
be obtained faster. In 2004, tools merging all these attacks were publicly dis-
closed [10, 11].
In 2005, Mantin presented additional attacks on truncated RC4 in [12], based
on the Jenkins correlations [13]. In 2006, Klein applied the same correlations to
WEP [14] to provide a remarkable known-plaintext attack which does not need
weak IVs to recover the secret key. The same year, Bittau, Handley and Lackey
presented in [15] new active attacks able to inject and decrypt data without
recovering the secret key (these attacks are based on the fragmentation feature
provided by the IEEE 802.11 standard). Finally, in 2007, a correlation related
to the first three bytes of the secret key and the first byte of the keystream has
been presented in [16].
In order to correct the weaknesses discovered before 2004, the Wi-Fi Alliance
proposed in [17] a WEP improved protocol called WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Ac-
cess). It has been established that WPA must be hardware compatible with
existing WEP capable devices to be deployed as a software patch. Basically,
WPA is a WEP wrapper which contains anti-replay protections and a key man-
agement scheme to avoid key reuse. However, the correlations discovered in this
paper are still almost theoretically applicable to WPA despite that the RC4 se-
cret key is completely different for each encrypted packet. In 2004, the Wi-Fi
Alliance finally proposed a new standard called IEEE 802.11i or WPA2 [18],
where RC4 can be replaced by AES.
Limitation of the Existing Attacks. Almost all key recovery attacks are
related to the value of the IV: each recovered secret key byte is provided by a
specific weak IV class. However, an attacker does not control the value of the
IV. It means that the attacker cannot recover the secret byte K[i] if he was not
able to eavesdrop encrypted packets from its weak IV class.
In parallel, Klein’s key recovery attack is related to the knowledge of the
plaintext, which cannot be completely determined with passive-only attacks. In-
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deed, the secret key byte K[i] cannot be recovered if the ith byte of the plaintext
is unknown.
Moreover, all existing key recovery attacks suffer from a relation between
the secret key bytes. To recover the byte K[i] of the secret key, we need to
successfully rederive the previous bytes K[0], K[1], . . . ,K[i−1]. In practice, this
constraint is a significant limitation because if the key recovery process does
not work for only one key byte (because not enough encrypted packets were
captured by the attacker from the concerning weak IV class or because a byte
of the plaintext is unknown), all the following key bytes will be probably mis-
recovered. Furthermore, WPA and some implementations of WEP filter the weak
IV classes discovered by Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir in [3].
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose an improvement, applicable to all
the key recovery attacks to significantly reduce the key dependency. Therefore,
it becomes possible to independently recover some parts of the secret key. It
means that even if an attacker has passively eavesdropped a very limited number
of encrypted packets, he is now able to recover a part of the secret key1. The
missing key bytes may be recovered by an exhaustive search. Because we can
do the assumption that the secret key byte K[i] can be recovered even if the
preceding key bytes are unknown, new weak IV classes have been discovered.
These new attacks improve the global key recovery process.
By significantly reducing the secret key byte dependency, we have highlighted
additional weaknesses. In RC4, the key is used modulo its size. It means that
the secret key byte K[i] is equal to K[i + kℓ] (where ℓ is the size of the key,
k = 1, 2, . . . and i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ℓ − 1). This property was irrelevant for the
existing key recovery attacks because the whole secret key had to be recovered
to attack the repetition. Without the secret key byte dependency, we are able
to provide new weak IV classes attacking K[i + kℓ], where k = 1, 2, . . . ,m. A
practical analysis of this improvement is given in order to prove the efficiency of
these new key recovery attacks on WEP.
Structure of the Paper. Section 2 describes the foundation of the key recovery
attacks on WEP, in particular the attack discovered by Fluhrer, Mantin and
Shamir in [3] and the Klein attack, described in [14]. In Section 3, we study how
to reduce the key bytes dependency. In section 4, we explain how to exploit the
modulo operation in the KSA and how the repetition of the secret key provides
new weak IV classes. Section 5 describes our practical attack. Finally we conclude
with further improvements.
1 This attack has been independently rediscovered later in April 2007 by Tews, Wein-
mann, and Pyshkin in [19]. It is based on [14] but applies to active attacks. In this
paper, we decided to focus on passive ones since it is the gateway for the WPA
analysis.
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2 Foundation of the Key Recovery Attacks
2.1 Description of RC4
The stream cipher RC4 is divided into two parts: the Key Scheduling Algorithm
(KSA) and the Pseudo Random Generator Algorithm (PRGA). The KSA gen-
erates an initial state from a random key K of ℓ words of n bits as described in
Algorithm 1. It starts with an array {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, where N = 2n and swaps
N pairs. At the end, we obtain the initial state SN−1.
Algorithm 1 RC4 Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA)
1: for i = 0 to N − 1 do
2: S[i]← i
3: end for
4: j ← 0
5: for i = 0 to N − 1 do
6: j ← j + S[i] +K[i mod ℓ]
7: swap(S[i],S[j])
8: end for
Once the initial state SN−1 created, it will be used by the second part of RC4,
the PRGA. Its role is to generate a keystream of bytes which will be XORed
with the plaintext to obtain the ciphertext. Thus, RC4 computes the loop of the
PRGA each time a new keystream byte zi is needed, according to Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 RC4 Pseudo Random Generator Algorithm (PRGA)
1: i← 0
2: j ← 0
3: loop
4: i← i+ 1
5: j ← j + S[i]
6: swap(S[i],S[j])
7: keystream byte zi = S[S[i] + S[j]]
8: end loop
Let Si[k] denotes the value of the array S at the index k, after the round i in the
KSA. Let S−1i [p] be the index of the value p in the array S after the round i in
the KSA. For example S−1i [Si[k]] = k and Si[S
−1
i [p]] = p. Let ji be the value of
j during the round i where the rounds are indexed in accordance with i. Thus,
the KSA has rounds 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 and the PRGA has rounds 1, 2, . . . Let S′1
denotes the array S after the first round of the PRGA (i.e. S′1 is equal to SN−1
with SN−1[1] and SN−1[SN−1[1]] swapped). We define z1, the first byte of the
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keystream as:
z1 = S
′
1[S
′
1[1] + S
′
1[SN−1[1]]] = S
′
1[SN−1[SN−1[1]] + SN−1[1]] (1)
2.2 KSA Evolution
Definition 1 (p–protected). During the KSA process, if S−1p [m] ≤ p, we say
that the value m is p–protected.
To illustrate this definition, we present an example with the first three rounds
of some KSA process. The values in bold are i–protected. We remark that if
m = Si[k] is i–protected, then m = Si+1[k] if and only if ji+1 6= k. In the KSA,
this happens with probability of about 1− 1/N .
Si i ji i–protected values
0 1 2 3 4 . . . 255 Init Init
3 1 2 0 4 . . . 255 0 3 {3}
1 3 2 0 4 . . . 255 1 0 {1, 3}
1 3 42 0 4 . . . 255 2 42 {1, 3, 42}
During the KSA, a permutation is done between two values at the end of each
round. The indices of the two swapped values are given by i and ji. Although the
value of i is predictable, the evolution of ji depends on the secret key and may be
considered as random. To facilitate the analysis of the KSA we will approximate
some rounds of the KSA by an idealized version in which step 6 assigns a random
byte in register j.2 However, even if ji is considered as random, it is possible
to guarantee with a relatively high probability that some values will not be
modified during the process of the KSA. We propose to redefine the Evolution
lemma given by Mantin in [12]:
Lemma 2 (Evolution Lemma). Consider an idealized KSA where j is picked
randomly for the last (N − p) rounds. Let I be a set of p–protected values of
cardinality x. The probability that no element of I is swapped during the last
(N − p) rounds of the KSA is
P (x, p) =
(
N − x
N
)N−p
Furthermore, if I is a set of (p−1)–protected values and J is a non-intersecting
set of p–protected values, the probability that no element of I is swapped during
round p and no element of I ∪ J is swapped during the last rounds is
P (#I,#J , p) =
N −#I
N
(
N −#I −#J
N
)N−p
2 This approximation was also used by Mironov in [20].
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2.3 Description of WEP
According to [1], WEP uses RC4 with N = 256 and n = 8 to provide confiden-
tiality. The key contains a 24-bit long IV concatenated to a secret key of 40 or
104 bits. Thus, the complete key size is either 64 or 128 bits. Consider a 64-bit
(8 bytes) key size:
K = K[0]||K[1]||K[2]||K[3]|| . . . ||K[7] = IV0||IV1||IV2||K[3]|| . . . ||K[7]
where IVi represents the i
th byte of the IV and K[3]|| . . . ||K[7] the secret part
of the key. In theory, the value of the IV should be random but in practice, it
is a counter mostly in little-endian and incremented by one each time a new
802.11b frame is encrypted. Thus, each packet uses a slightly different key. The
key K is used by RC4 and the resulting keystream is XORed with the plaintext
to obtain the ciphertext. Unfortunately, a portion of the plaintext is practically
constant [21] and some of the following bytes can be derived. They correspond
to the LLC header and the SNAP header and some bytes of the TCP/IP encap-
sulated frame. For example, by XORing the first byte of the ciphertext with the
constant value 0xAA, we obtain the first byte of the keystream.
2.4 Description of WPA
WPA has been designed for use with an IEEE 802.1X authentication server with
the aim to distribute different keys to each user. However, it can also be used
in a lightweighted mode called ”pre-shared key” (WPA-PSK), where every user
is given the same key. According to [17], each user must enter a pass-phrase
to access the network. The pass-phrase may be from 8 to 63 printable ASCII
characters or 64 hexadecimal digits. The major improvement in WPA over WEP
is the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), a key management scheme to
avoid key reuse. TKIP is a key scheduling in two phases used to generate a
completely different RC4 key for each transmitted packet (called Per Packet
Key). Thus, even if the attacks based on weak IVs and the Klein attack still
exist, an attacker will have only one trial to recover a specific RC4 secret key.
Moreover, a filter avoids the use of some weak IV classes (but only the weak IV
class discovered by Fluhrer Mantin and Shamir in [3]). In addition, WPA also
provides packet integrity which prevents replay attacks being executed. Thus,
only passive key recovery attacks are theoretically applicable to WPA.
2.5 The Fluhrer Mantin and Shamir (FMS) Attack
To understand how key recovery attacks work, we briefly present the FMS attack.
According to [3], this attack uses the property of some specific IV values called
weak keys. Let IV0 = 3, IV1 = 255 and IV2 equals some arbitrary value x 6∈
{251, 252}. We assume that j3 is different from {0, 1}. Our goal is to obtain the
value of the first secret byte of the key K[3]. Due to the assumption on x, x+5
is different from {0, 1}. Together with the assumptions on j3, we obtain that the
first four rounds of the KSA are given by:
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Si i j
0 1 2 3 4 · · · 255
3 1 2 0 4 · · · 255 0 0 + 0 + IV0 = 3
3 0 2 1 4 · · · 255 1 3 + S0[1] + IV1 = 3
3 0 x + 5 1 4 · · · 255 2 3 + S1[2] + IV2 = x+ 5
3 0 · S2[j3] · · · · 255 3 x+ 5 + S2[3] +K[3] = j3
Because K[3] is unknown, we cannot predict the values of S[i], i ∈ {3, . . . , 255}
after the round 2, however they will eventually change, according to the KSA.
Now we suppose that S2[0] = S3[0] = S255[0] = 3, S2[1] = S3[1] = S255[1] = 0
and S3[3] = S255[3] = S2[j3]. Following the Evolution lemma with I = {0, 3},
J = {S2[3]} and p = 3, the probability that j3 6= {0, 1} and S2[j3] remains at
the same place is P (2, 1, 3) ≈ 5%. According to our assumptions and (1), the
first byte of the keystream generated by the PRGA is:
S i j
3 0 · S2[j3] · · · · 255
0 3 · S2[j3] · · · · 255 1 j + S255[i] = 0 + 0 = 0
z1 = S
′
1[S
′
1[1]+S
′
1[S255[1]] = S
′
1[S255[0]+S255[1]]
5%
= Sp[Sp−1[0]+Sp−1[1]] = S2[j3]
Note that z1 6= {0, 3} when this holds. We can now easily recover the secret key
byte K[3] because the first byte of the keystream can be recovered: z1 = S2[j3] =
c0 ⊕ 0xAA where c0 is the first byte of the ciphertext and 0xAA the first constant
byte of the plaintext, the LLC header. Thus, K[3] = S−12 [z1] − S2[3] − j2 =
S−12 [z1]− x− 6. We notice that the weak IV class given by IV0 = 3, IV1 = 255
and IV2 = x can be described as a specific S2 table state class where S2[1] = 0
and S2[0] = 3.
We can generalize the FMS attack: we need a large amount of encrypted
packets where the value of the IV gives the state Sp−1 such that Sp−1[1] =
0, Sp−1[0] = p and z1 6= {0, p}. This defines the weak IV class which recovers
the secret key byte K[p]. The secret key byte is rederived with a probability of
success PFMS(p) = P (2, 1, p) according to the Evolution lemma.
K[p]
PFMS(p)
= S−1p−1[z1]− Sp−1[p]− jp−1
= S−1p−1[z1]−
p∑
j=1
Sj−1[j]−
p−1∑
i=0
K[i] (2)
The attacker will then collect the probed values for K[p], according to (2) and
finally select the one with the highest vote. Note that to rederive the secret
key byte K[p], the attack must successfully recover the previous bytes K[p −
1], . . . ,K[3] in order to compute Sp−1[p] and jp−1.
Nowadays, there are dozens of known key recovery attacks similar to the
FMS attack. In order to have a relevant list of the known attacks, one has to
read [22] or the source code of the tool Aircrack [11] or Weplab [10]. These
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attacks are divided into three categories. The first kind of attack uses only z1
and the state of the array Sp−1 of the KSA to recover the secret key (typically
the FMS attack). The second one uses z1 and z2. Note that they can easily be
extended to the combination of every known zi to provide more weak IV classes.
The last one highlights the unprobable secret key bytes, they are called negative
attacks.
2.6 The Klein Attack
In 2006, Andreas Klein presented in [14] a practical application of the Jenkins
correlation [13] to WEP.
Theorem 3. Let S′i be the i
th step of the PRGA where the internal state is a
random permutation, and a random value j,
Pr (zi + S
′
i[j] mod N = c) =


2
N
if c = i
N−2
N(N−1) if c 6= i
Klein demonstrated a strong correlation in the 7th step of the PRGA which is
not related to a specific weak IV class. It means that each eavesdropped packet
may rederive the secret key.
S′i[j]
Pj
= i− zi (From Theorem 3 with Pj = 2/N) (3)
S′i−1[i]
P ′
= Si[i] P
′ = ((N − 1)/N)N−2 (4)
S′i[j] = S
′
i−1[i] (step 6 of the PRGA) (5)
Si[i] = Si−1[ji] (KSA) (6)
ji = Si−1[i] + ji−1 +K[i] (step 6 of the KSA) (7)
From (3) with respectively (4), (5), (6) and (7) we have
K[p]
PKlein= S−1p−1 [p− zp mod N ]− Sp−1[p]− jp−1 mod N (8)
which hold with a probability
PKlein =
2
N
·
(
N − 1
N
)N−2
+
N − 2
N(N − 1)
·
(
1−
(
N − 1
N
)N−2)
≈
1.36
N
(9)
A significant limitation of the Klein key recovery attack is that to recover the
secret key byte K[i], the ith byte of the keystream has to be known.
3 The VX Attack: How to Reduce the Secret Key Bytes
Dependency
A major issue related to all key recovery attacks is that if a secret key byte
has not been correctly recovered, the whole key will be probably mis-recovered
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due to the key byte dependency (to rederive K[i], the previous secret key bytes
K[i − 1],K[i − 2], . . . ,K[3] must be successfully recovered). In this section we
present a new attack, called VX, able to recover more efficiently the secret key
by significantly reducing the key bytes dependency.
3.1 The FMS Key Recovery Attack
The paradigm of this attack is to recover independently the sum of the secret
key bytes by computing some predictable parts of the equation (2). Consider the
FMS attack described above. According to (2), we obtain
p∑
i=0
K[i]
PFMS(p)
= S−1p−1[z1]−
p∑
j=1
Sj−1[j] (10)
Consider that we only know the state S2 specified by the IV. We define P1(p),
the probability that S−1p−1[z1] = S
−1
2 [z1] in the idealized version of the KSA by
P1(p) = Pr
(
S−1p−1[z1] = S
−1
2 [z1]
)
=
(
N − 1
N
)p−2
, p ≥ 2 (11)
The array Sj with j = 0, 1, . . . , p−1 is partially known if p is small, because it is
close to the initialization state of S at the beginning of the KSA where S[i] = i.
Thus the sum
∑p
j=1 Sj−1[j] is equivalent to S0[1] + S1[2] +
∑p
j=3 S2[j] with a
probability P2(p).
3
P2(p) = Pr

 p∑
j=1
Sj−1[j] = S0[1] + S1[2] +
p∑
j=3
S2[j]


≈
p∏
m=3
(
N − p+m
N
)
, p ≥ 3 (12)
Thus, we can recover independently each sum of the key bytes K[0 . . . p], where
K[i . . . j] = K[i] + K[i + 1] + . . . + K[j], j ≥ i with a probability of success
PVXF (p) = PFMS(3) · P1(p) · P2(p) and p = 3, 4, . . . , ℓ− 1. Indeed, using (11) and
(12) in (10), we have
K[3 . . . p]
PVXF (p)= S−12 [z1]− S0[1]− S1[2]−
p∑
j=3
S2[j]−
2∑
v=0
IVv (13)
since the key bytes K[0],K[1] and K[2] are known and different for each packet
because they correspond to the IV, we store the votes for the secret and fixed
part of the key, the sum K[3 . . . p]. Equation (13) is a correlation between a byte
depending on the secret key only and a byte which can be computed from the
802.11b frame only. Finally, each secret key byte K[i] can be recovered with
K[p] = K[3 . . . p]−K[3 . . . (p− 1)]
3 This is an improvement of the correlation discovered by Roos in [4]
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3.2 The Klein Key Recovery Attack
The same technique can be applied to the Klein key recovery attack. Indeed, the
dependency is based on the same values, only the probability PFMS is different.
According to (8) we have,
p∑
i=0
K[i]
PKlein(p)
= S−1p−1[p− zp mod N ]−
p∑
j=1
Sj−1[j]
Thus, we can apply the same technique described above and we obtain that
K[3 . . . p]
PVXK (p)= S−12 [p− zp mod N ] (14)
−S0[1]− S1[2]−
p∑
j=3
S2[j]−
2∑
v=0
IVv
where
PKleinTot = P1(p) · P2(p) ·
(
N − 1
N
)N−2
PVXK (p) =
2
N
· PKleinTot +
N − 2
N(N − 1)
· (1− PKleinTot)
Note that for some values of the key bytes, the Klein attack may not work.
4 Weaknesses in the Modulo Operation of the KSA
During the KSA of RC4, the key is used modulo its size. It means that the
secret key byte K[i] = K[i+ kℓ], where ℓ is the size of the key, k = 1, 2, . . . ,m
and i = 3, . . . , ℓ − 1. We remark that if an attacker is unable to recover the
secret key byte K[i] (because not enough frames were captured from its weak
IV class or because the keystream byte needed to recover the secret key byte
is unknown), he could be interested to recover the key byte K[i + ℓ] (through
another weak IV class or another keystream byte) instead of K[i]. Due to the
key bytes dependency, this property was irrelevant for the existing key recovery
attacks. Indeed, the whole secret key had to be recovered to attack the modulo
repetition.
4.1 Weakness in the Repetition of the Secret Key
According to the VX attack, it is possible to recover independently the value
of the secret key bytes sum K[3 . . . p] where p = i + kℓ, k = 0, 1, . . . .m and
i = 3, . . . ℓ− 1. Consider the FMS attack described above and the equation (13).
We define,
K[p] , K[3 . . . i] + k ·K[3 . . . (ℓ− 1)]
PVXF (p)= S−12 [z1]− S0[1]− S1[2]−
p∑
j=3
S2[j]− (k + 1) ·
2∑
v=0
IVv (15)
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If an attacker has not enough weak IV to recover the sum K[3 . . . i] but he is able
to rederive correctly K[3 . . . (ℓ− 1)], the targeted sum can be recovered when a
vote for K[p] is collected, according to (15) with k ≥ 1. The same technique can
be used with the Klein attack when the keystream byte needed to recover the
secret key byte is unknown.
4.2 Weakness in the Repetition of the IV
In the previous section, we have seen that the key repetition can be used to
recover a part of the secret key if the sum K[3 . . . (ℓ − 1)] has been correctly
rederived. An interesting feature of WEP is that the three first repeated bytes of
the key are publicly disclosed, they correspond to the IV. Because these values
are known, they can be used to recover more efficiently the critical secret key
bytes sum K[3 . . . (ℓ − 1)]. For p = i + kℓ with i = {0, 1, 2} we define K[p] =
k ·K[3 . . . (ℓ− 1)]. Thus,
K[p] , k ·K[3 . . . (ℓ− 1)]
PVXF (p)= S−12 [z1]− S0[1]− S1[2]−
p∑
j=3
S2[j]− k ·
2∑
j=0
IVj −
i∑
j=0
IVj (16)
Thus, four weak IV classes, instead of only one are dedicated to the recovery of
the critical sum above. The same technique can be used with the Klein attack:
four different keystream bytes may rederive the secret key sum. This finally leads
us to many attack on byte K[p] where all bytes are linked by,
K[p] =
{
k ·K[3 . . . (ℓ− 1)] +K[3 . . . (p mod ℓ)] for p mod ℓ = 3 . . . ℓ− 1
k ·K[3 . . . ℓ− 1] for p mod ℓ = 0, 1, 2
(17)
5 Attack Principle
The principle of the attack is composed of three parts. The first one collects
the IVs and the known keystream bytes of the passively eavesdropped 802.11
packets. Note that some keystream bytes are unknown (the Appendix A gives
the probable plaintext bytes, for TCP and ARP packets, needed to recover the
keystream bytes). For each known keystream byte zp, the extended Klein attack
described above will return a probed byte n for the sum of secret key bytes K[p]
weighted by Pv the success probability of the vote. The key recovery attacks
based on the IV are similarly used, by using the IV and the two first bytes of
the keystream z1 and z2.
Once the vote process is accomplished, we use two techniques to rederive more
efficiently the secret key sumK[ℓ−1]. Firstly we take profit of the modulo repeti-
tion of the IV according to (16). Secondly, we do an autocorrelation on the r dis-
crete signals K[3] + k ·K[ℓ− 1]||K[4] + k ·K[ℓ− 1]|| . . . ||K[ℓ− 2] + k ·K[ℓ− 1]
k = 0, 1, . . . , r where the time shifting value corresponds to K[ℓ− 1]. When the
autocorrelation is maximized for a given K[ℓ − 1], it is considered as the most
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probable value. We merge the results given by the autocorrelation for each po-
tential value of K[ℓ−1] with the votes given by (16) and we sort them according
to their votes. Once K[ℓ − 1] is fixed we compute the votes for the repeated
secret keys and we merge all the votes.
Algorithm 3 VX Key Recovery Attack
VX(IV,Z): IV , the set of known keystream bytes Z where zi is the i
th byte of the
keystream.
Data: V is a (N × (ℓ ·m− 3)) matrix
Data: V ′ is a (N × (ℓ− 1)) matrix
Output: The secret key K
1: for each passively eavesdropped packet {IV, Z} do
2: (n, p, Pv)← WeakAttack(IV, z1, z2)
3: Vn,p ← Vn,p + Pv
4: (n, p, Pv)← KleinAttack(IV,Z)
5: Vn,p ← Vn,p + Pv
6: end for
7: for each r repetition of the secret key do
8: for n = 0 to N − 1 do
9: Vn,r·ℓ−1 ← Vn.r·ℓ−1 + Vn.r·ℓ + Vn.r·ℓ+1 + Vn.r·ℓ+2
10: end for
11: end for
12: V ← Autocorrelation(V )
13: V ′ ← MergeVotes(V )
14: for i = 0 to M do
15: pick K the next most probable secret key in V ′
16: if K uses another value for K[ℓ− 1] then
17: V ← Autocorrelation(V )
18: V ′ ← MergeVotes(V )
19: end if
20: if K is correct return K
21: end for
Finally, we successively test the first M secret keys, according to their dis-
tance to the most probable value (with the highest amount of vote). Note that
each time a new value for K[ℓ − 1] is selected, we have to recompute the votes
for all the repetition of the secret key bytes. See Algorithm 3 for more details.
5.1 Practical Results on WEP
To demonstrate the improvement of the VX attack, we tried to recover ran-
domly generated WEP 104-bit secret keys with a limited number of frames and
randomly chosen IVs.
A first issue concerning the Klein attack, which is more efficient than the
key recovery attacks based on weak IVs, is the ability to obtain the plaintext.
Thus, we firstly concentrated our analysis on passively eavesdropped ARP frames
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Fig. 1. The probability to recover the correct key after an exhaustive search of 220
trials, according to the number of passively eavesdropped packets.
because the plaintext of an ARP frame can be practically guessed until the
32nd byte (see Appendix A). Then, we chose a more realistic scenario where
the eavesdropped traffic is mainly based on TCP frames (we used real network
traffic dumps for this scenario). According to Appendix A, when a TCP frame
is passively eavesdropped, the first and the second byte of the keystream, used
by the key recovery attacks based on weak IVs are practically always known.
However, the following keystream bytes needed for the Klein attack cannot be
completely recovered. By significantly reducing the key bytes dependency and
according to the modulo repetition, the VX attack is able to recover the secret
key, even if some keystream bytes are still unknown.
The table (Figure 1) gives the average number of ARP frames needed to
recover the complete secret key with an exhaustive search on a keyspace subset of
M = 220 entries (with the highest probability of success, according to our votes).
We notice that the average amount of ARP packets needed to recover the secret
key with a probability > 1/2 is 32,700. The same table gives, according to the
second scenario, the average number of frames needed to recover the complete
secret key with an exhaustive search on a subset keyspace of M = 220 entries
(with the highest probability of success, according to our votes). We notice that
the average amount of packets needed to recover the secret key for the same
probability is 44,500.
If we compare the VX attack with the previously published passive-only key
recovery attacks on WEP [10, 11], we reduce the data complexity from 220 to
215 for the same success probability to recover the secret key. We significantly
reduce the computational complexity as well because the recomputation of the
votes is not needed for each key trial.
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Moreover, the VX attack can be transformed to an active one and needs
about 25% less eavesdropped packets than the attack described in [19] thanks
to the weaknesses in the modulo repetition and the use of the enhanced key
recovery attacks based on weak IVs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have seen that all the previously discovered key recovery attacks
(the Klein attack as well as the key recovery attacks based on weak IVs) suffer
from a relation between the secret key bytes. To rederive the ith byte of the
secret key, we have to successfully recover the (i − 1) previous key bytes. In
practice, this constraint is a significant limitation because if the key recovery
process does not work for only one byte of the key, the complete key will be
probably mis-recovered.
According to the VX attack presented in this paper, we are now able to
significantly reduce the key bytes dependency and thus, to recover correctly
each key byte with a stronger probability, even if some preceding secret key
bytes are still unknown.
Because the ith byte of the secret key can be recovered even if some previous
bytes are missing, new weak IV classes appear.
Moreover, it becomes possible to take profit of the modulo repetition weak-
nesses of the secret key in the KSA of RC4 described in this paper, to improve
the global key recovery process.
We showed that the Klein attack needs to know the (i − 1)th byte of the
keystream to recover the ith byte of the secret key. However, this information
cannot always be obtained with passive-only key recovery attacks. Associated to
the enhanced attacks based on weak IVs and the modulo repetition weaknesses
of the secret key (both presented in this paper), a part of the missing secret key
bytes can be passively recovered.
Consequently, the VX attack is to the best of our knowledge, the most effi-
cient passive-only key recovery attack on WEP. The previous ones needed about
one million of passively eavesdropped packets to recover the secret key with a
probability bigger than one half. The VX attack needs about 44,500 packets for
the same success probability.
A question raised in this paper is the motivation to find new key recovery
attacks on WEP: a still widely used protocol, but already broken since 2001. The
weaknesses highlighted in this paper concern theoretically WPA as well. Indeed,
only passive attacks are applicable on WPA because of anti-replay protections.
In spite of the fact that the VX attack cannot be practically exploited on WPA,
it represents a relevant first step for its analysis.
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A Appendix
ARP Packet
0xAA DSAP
0xAA SSAP
0x03 CTRL
0x00
0x00 ORG Code
0x00
0x08 ARP
0x06
0x00 Ethernet
0x01
0x08 IP
0x00
0x06 Hardware size
0x04 Protocol
0x00 Opcode Request/Reply
0x??
0x?? MAC addr src
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x?? IP src
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x?? MAC addr dst
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x?? IP dst
0x??
0x??
0x??
TCP Packet
0xAA DSAP
0xAA SSAP
0x03 CTRL
0x00
0x00 ORG Code
0x00
0x08 IP
0x00
0x45 IP Version + Header length
0x?? Packet length
0x??
0x?? IP ID RFC815
0x??
0x?? Fragment type and offset
0x?? TTL
0x06 TCP type
0x?? Header checksum
0x??
0x?? IP src
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x?? IP dst
0x??
0x??
0x??
0x?? Port src
0x??
0x?? Port dst
0x??
Fig. 2. The tables above represent the plaintext bytes of 802.11 data frames encapsu-
lating resp. ARP and TCP protocols. The value in white are almost fixed or can be
computed dynamically. The values in light grey can be guessed. The values in dark
grey are not predictable.
